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Bali and Balinese's culture in detail which is great!!!
An Oldie but Still the best
Essential reading!

INTERROGATION OF THE PHILIPPINE COLONIAL CONDITION
IMPORTANT COLLECTION OF ESSAYS ABOUT PHILIPPINES
An Invaluable Collection

I WAS THERE
OUTSTANDING PLAY BY PLAY OF WHAT WAS GOING ON THERE
A testament to the U.S. Marine Corps fighting spirit.

Concise book on Bali!!!
knopf guide bali
For those who want to learn from, not just visit, Bali!

Well researched and balancedWolff has done some extensive research and has come up with a balanced account of the situation in the Philippines during the Spanish American war. Little is really known of the extent of the atrocities that were the result of the Manifest Destiny and Benevolent Assimilation ideology but Wolf is balanced in his treatment of, on the Militray side: Aguinaldo, Dewey, Otis, and McArthur. On the political side, he is clear to point out that there was opposition to this proclomation for many reasons. His extensive treatment of the debate between William Jennings Bryan and William McKinley are also very extensive. An easy book to read and a very extensive and well researched piece. I give it 5 stars.
Miguel Llora
Classic account of the American-Filipino War
The Philippines - One Hundred Years Later

Balancing and Rich Asian people's images.But there is unbalance information in the book I noticed, specially information about Indonesian muslim in the introduction. Steve Raymer seems doesn't have a good source that he can get the information about Indonesian muslim. Might be because they are so many and he tries to put it in the same ammount as Malaysian which is only about 1/6 or 1/8 of Indonesian in comparison. It is best if he can consult or clarify his information with the Indonesian sociologists, historians, or scholars in order to validate the information. One of the examples is on second page, the picture doesn't not macth the note (citation). The picture is showing the people who are suplicating, is not always in arabic, but he says those people are reciting the koran. This is just small example.
I recommend people who have this book to check with the Southeast Asian people to clarify the information.
More than that, good work and well done.
CaptivatingRaymer, in my opinion, succeeded in shattering the perpetuated myth surrounding the perception of Muslims. Not only does he cogently disprove the notion of a monolithic Muslim culture across the Muslim world, but he also demonstrates the existence of diversity with which Islam is practiced in this forgotten region. The cognitive image of either a rich Middle-Easterner or a terrorist brandishing an AK-47 so often associated with Islam must now be relegated to the domain of stereotypes. The book is probably a silent apologist for the peace of Islam.
Caveat emptor for those expecting their stereotypes confirmed and prejudices accomodated; the book is sure to frustrate them.
The maxim that a picture is worth a thousand words had never been truer. The picture is now worth millions of humans.
Good, balanced view of Muslims in Southeast Asia

Excellent!
Excellent resource for travellingTake this book if you're off to Java. It's a wonderful wonderful place, so don't miss it if you've ever considered going East!
If you have only the place for one book, take this one

Lao Phrasebookto learn English. [reasonable] price and great book, what can I say.
Nifty little phrasebook
It's a very through pocket book that can guide you in Laos

Finally!How many know that in 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a policy paper stating that military involvement in Indochina would be "an anti-historical act likely in the long run to create more problems than it solves and cause more damage than benefit"?
How many know that in 1967 the Joint Chiefs of Staff threatened to walk out on the president if he didn't call off military involvement?
My guess is that most Americans still believe that the majority of military leaders favored intervention and "were not allowed to win."
As Buzzanco makes clear, if that belief prevails in spite of the facts, Americans will have learned nothing from the tragedy that we call the Vietnam War. And given the current political and military situation, what we have, or haven't, learned has never mattered more.
In a masterfully concise and thorough way, Buzzanco assembles the most important but previously scattered findings about America's involvement in Vietnam. He is among the rarest of authors -- a readable scholar, one who can write for the masses. And the fact that he's a scholar is important. Journalists, who usually write the readable stuff, have lost too much credibility with the American public.
Upon finishing this relatively short but remarkably full account, all I could say was, "Finally!" The research and documentation to support Buzzanco's findings have been accumulating for years. As someone with a history degree who has tried to keep up, I applaud his ability to exhume, organize and present the essential and long buried information.
For those who demand more, there are reams of source material. For those who have been looking for a clear and credible synopsis based on what we now know, this is it.
I continue to hope that the publisher and the attending media will place it where the masses can find it.
Helps refute the "stabbed in the back" lieThe result was that over and over again officers raised the same unalterable points. You cannot bomb the North into submission, and you cannot defeat the NLF in the South with the corrupt and incompetent Southern regime we possess. Of course, much of this was the army, the navy and the air forces criticizing the other services plans. But as it turned out they were right and Buzzanco shows that the army was not stabbed in the back. A review of America's long involvement should help demonstrate this. In 1947, General George Marshall said that the French "have no prospect" of success in Vietnam. Five years later the Joint Chief of Staff were unanimously opposed to committing any American troops into Vietnam. General Matthew Ridgeway's opposition to assisting the French after Dien Bien Phu was crucial to the Geneva Accords.
Flash forward ten years and Johnson's decision to expand the war. 1964 is a year filled with concerns over the collapse of the South Vietnamese authority, concerns about NLF strength, and strategic dithering. It is important to point out that Westmoreland, along with other officers like Wheeler, Johnson, and MacDonald opposed an all-out air war because they believed the Southern regime was too fragile to survive VC counterattacks. Pacification was dying and in only about 20% of the villages were the residents willing to provide RVN officials with information about the Viet Cong. In 1965 the war escalates. The army Chief of Staff suggests US military involvement will last at least five years, and could go as long as 20. "In I Corps, where the Marines were deployed, `the communist guerrillas enjoyed essentially uncontested dominance over most of the rural population,' they [the Corps] admitted." Conservative critics have blamed LBJ for not supporting an all-out air war. But at the time army leaders were divided about the effectiveness of such a strategy. Westmoreland thought that an air war would be ineffective as long as the situation of the South was on the verge of collapse. Westmoreland and Taylor were surprised at how often the White House took the initiative in demanding the offensive.
1966 and 1967: the officers quarrel about attrition, the air war and reinforcement, each pointing out the flaws in the other's arguments and nobody really very optimistic about a solution. "Admiral Sharp...pointed out that the United States had already caused heavy damage to most of the important military targets in the DRVN by August 1965, yet no American commander was suggesting that such measures had significantly altered the military situation in Vietnam." In response to the full-scale American invasion, the Vietcong and the PAVN were stepping up their recruitment and matching the Americans. Meanwhile Maxwell Taylor pointed out that the ARVN was shirking its duties, when the whole point of intervention was supposedly to stiffen their spine. Various officers called for more reinforcements and more troops. Even though they could make no promise that this would have any real effect, it could give them an alibi after an American defeat. In January 1967 the MACV found that it had underestimated VC and PAVN major unit attacks by a factor of four. Despite much blather about having their hands tied, the air force and the army culpably failed to protect their bases from guerrilla attacks.
Finally, 1968. Supporters of the war have argued that the Tet offensive was in fact a glorious American victory. But an obtuse and biased media convinced the American public the opposite. In fact, as Clark Clifford pointed, at the time many senior military leaders were on the verge of panic. As low morale, drug abuse, and fragging ravaged the American army, Westmoreland partially admitted the obvious: the Communist goal was not to expel the Americans, but to undermine what southern faith remained the RVN's government and army. The average ARVN battalion strength was at 50%, and it had lost one-quarter of its pre-Tet strength. Even hard-line senators such as Stennis and Jackson were beginning to waver, while pacification and counter-insurgency had been ravaged. Vann, Lansdale and others pointed out ARVN Corruption, intense popular opposition to American destructiveness and the culture of euphemism and denial at military headquarters. The one flaw in this book is that more is not said about the post-1968 war, though the government has made sure that primary documents are much less available. Based on 62 sets of private papers and oral histories and firmly well documented, this is a book that will be read for years to come.
Brilliant! My most enthusiastic recommendation.Following the 1968 Tet offensive, Buzzanco reveals, most civilian and military leaders recognized the futility of the conflict and wanted to get out of Vietnam. Unable to do so, however, they participated in mutual recrimination and propagandizing. The result was a web of myth that pervades U.S. civil-military relations even after Desert Storm; which was, perhaps, reinforced by Desert Storm.
Buzzanco's brilliant scholarship is a compact, unsettling, enlightening exploration of the defining Cold War conflict, and its enduring legacies.


Excellent. In 1994, 70 photographers descended on Vietnam for a week to take pictures of the Vietnamese at work from north to south. They caught people in the middle of shopping, selling, eating, working, napping, and so on. The result is a fascinating book detailing the life of Vietnamese during that week.
While most pictures are interesting and original, a few are unique to the Vietnamese society.
A deeply cultural perspective on lifestyles, culture, values
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